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Law Summary
Two Heads Are Better Than One:
Making a Case for the Either Party
Viewpoint for Removal
I. INTRODUCTION
To remove a claim to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the
defendant must show complete diversity in citizenship and must show that the
value of the plaintiff's claim exceeds seventy-five thousand dollars.' In actions
for removal, courts are finally recognizing the enormous inequity of looking only
to what the plaintiff believes is the value of the claim. To assess the true and
accurate value of the claim, courts should consider the amount the defendant
stands to lose as well as the amount the plaintiff stands to gain. It makes little
sense for the court to consider one party's viewpoint of the value of the case to
the exclusion of the other party.
Litigation is a game of strategy. Courts that value the amount in
controversy solely by the plaintiff's viewpoint encourage plaintiffs to engage in
gamesmanship and forum shopping, which unfairly prejudices defendants. In
light of the ambiguity of the removal statutes and the lack of clear precedent, the
federal circuits have diverged in the debate over which viewpoints deserve
consideration in removal actions. The three general approaches are to consider:
(1) only the plaintiff's viewpoint, (2) the viewpoint of the party seeking federal
jurisdiction, and (3) the viewpoint of either party. This Law Summary suggests
that the amount in controversy should be determined according to the viewpoint
of either party, where either the value to the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant
can be used to establish the jurisdictional amount.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Removal Statutes Do Not Favor a Particular Viewpoint
The removal requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 do not
contain an explicit amount in controversy requirement.' Instead, the statute
permits removal of any claim that could originally have been brought in federal
1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1332 (2000).
2. Id. § 1441. In addition, procedures for removal are described in 28 U.S.C.
Section 1446 (2000), and procedures after removal are explained in 28 U.S.C. Sections
1447-48 (2000).
1
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court3 Federal jurisdiction extends primarily where there is diversity4 of the
parties or the claim involves a federal question.' In diversity cases, the amount
in controversy for removal is determined by the record existing at the time the
removal petition is filed with the district court.6 That record can include a wide
variety of evidence of the amount in controversy, including affidavits,
documents, deposition testimony, answers to interrogatories, statements by
counsel, stipulations, settlement offers and other correspondence between the
parties.7 Additionally, the court may conduct a limited evidentiary hearing.'
Generally, when a defendant files for removal, the court first looks to see
if the plaintiff's state court complaint requests relief in excess of seventy-five
thousand dollars, exclusive of costs and interest.9 If so, the court will usually
conclude that federal jurisdiction exists.1" The much more controversial case
arises where the plaintiff either fails to request a specific amount, or where the
plaintiff requests equitable relief that has differing values or compliance costs to
the parties. A plaintiff can usually plead an amount below seventy-five thousand
dollars and later amend the complaint to increase the amount of damages
claimed." Because complaints are relatively easy to amend to increase the
requested relief, a potential for abuse or manipulation by the plaintiff exists. 2
3. Id. § 1441(a) ("[A]ny civil action ... of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed .... ").
4. Id. § 1441(b). The statute imposes the additional requirement of complete
diversity. If the cause of action does not arise from either the Constitution or federal law,
then it "shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." Id. The
amount in controversy for diversity claims must exceed seventy-five thousand dollars.
See id. § 1332.
5. Federal courts have jurisdiction over claims involving a federal question
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (2000).
6. See 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
3725, at 71-72 (3d ed. 1998).
7. See McIntire v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 911, 915 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(citing Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990));
Radmer v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, No. 99-0961-CV-W-9-4, 2000 WL 33910093, at *2
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 27,2000).
8. Ohio Nat', 922 F.2d at 325 (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413
(5th Cir. 1981); Mortenson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.
1977)).
9. 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3725, at 68.
10. Id. § 3725, at 73.
11. Id. § 3725, at 85-87. If a plaintiff later amends the complaint to request more
than seventy-five thousand dollars, the case becomes removable, and the defendant
ordinarily has thirty days to file for removal. Id. § 3725, at 87.
12. 28 U.S.C. Section 1446 (2000) prohibits diversity-based removal of any action
after one year. The one year time bar allows plaintiffs preferring state court to set a trap
[Vol. 69
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The removal statutes do not specify how the court should determine the value of
a claim when that value is not apparent from the face of the complaint. More
specifically, the removal statutes do not specify whose viewpoint the court may
consider in valuing the amount in controversy.
B. Supreme Court Decisions Do Not Favor a Particular Viewpoint
and the Circuit Courts Are Split
The United States Supreme Court's decisions give very little insight into
which viewpoints deserve consideration in valuing the amount in controversy.
The decisions also fail to answer whether the viewpoint considered should
depend on the type of relief requested.
The leading Supreme Court case, Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Co. v.
Ward, says only that the value of the amount in controversy is the "value of the
object.""3 Ward was a nuisance suit brought by a steamboat owner against the
defendant, who built a bridge across a river. 4 It is unclear whether the "value
of the object" referred to the value of the bridge, the value of the plaintiff's
steamboat business, the cost of removing the bridge or the plaintiff's right to be
free from the obstruction.'
Finding it difficult to derive any meaning from Ward, one might look for
guidance to the Supreme Court's 1915 decision in Glenwood Light& Water Co.
v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co.'6 In Glenwood, the plaintiff sought an
injunction to prevent the defendant power company's construction of poles and
wires, which interfered with the plaintiff's utility lines. 7 The Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
found that the plaintiff s right to be free from interference was worth an amount
that exceeded the amount in controversy.'8
Proponents of the plaintiff's viewpoint cite this case as implicitly ruling that
only the plaintiffs viewpoint should be considered in determining the amount
in controversy.' 9 The actual language of the opinion applies the plaintiffs
viewpoint but never rejects the use of the defendant's viewpoint.2" Moreover,
for inexperienced or careless defendants. Plaintiffs can plead lower damages, wait one
year, then amend the complaint to increase the damage amount. See infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
13. Miss. & Mo. R.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485,492 (1862).
14. Id. at 491.
15. 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3703, at 114.
16. 239 U.S. 121 (1915).
17. Id. at 125.
18. Id.
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it never addresses the real viewpoint controversy: when the defendant's value
satisfies the jurisdictional amount but the plaintiff's value does not." The only
proposition that is clear from Glenwood is that when the plaintiff seeks to
establish jurisdiction, the plaintiff's viewpoint is at least one viewpoint the court
may consider.
Is the court limited to the plaintiff's perspective in removal actions, or may
it consider the defendant's viewpoint in certain circumstances? In the absence
of a Supreme Court decision, most federal circuits adopted one of the following
viewpoints: (1) the plaintiff's viewpoint, (2) the viewpoint of the party seeking
jurisdiction, or (3) either party's viewpoint. The Second,22 Third,2 Fifth, 4
Eighth2 and Eleventh26 Circuits appear to follow the plaintiff s viewpoint, which
prohibits using the defendant's viewpoint as a basis for federal courtjurisdiction.
A few lower courts have applied the viewpoint of the party seekingjurisdiction.27
Under that view, the court considers only the plaintiff's perspective to establish
diversity jurisdiction and considers only the defendant's perspective for
removal. 28 The First,29 Seventh,30 Ninth,3' Tenth,3 2 andpossibly Fourth33 Circuits
apply the either party viewpoint, which allows the court to consider the value to
21. Id.
22. See Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46,49 (2d Cir. 1972).
23. See In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1994).
24. See Alfonso v. Hillsboro County Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir.
1962).
25. See infra notes 34-58 and accompanying text. The Eighth Circuit's position
is somewhat unclear but is most consistent with the plaintiff's viewpoint.
26. See Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications
& Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 219 (1 th Cir. 1997).
27. For district courts following the party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint, see
Bergstrom v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 895 F. Supp. 257,261 (D.N.D. 1995); Solna,
Inc. v. Am. Printing Equip., Inc., No. 89-0715-CV-W-5, 1989 WL 325976, at *3 (W.D.
Mo. Sept. 20, 1989); Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enters. Div., Consol. Foods Corp.,
369 F. Supp. 766, 769 (E.D. Ky. 1973); and Inman v. Milwhite Co., 261 F. Supp. 703,
708 (E.D. Ark. 1966).
28. 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3703, at 125.
29. See Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311, 314 (1 st Cir. 1969).
30. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 609
(7th Cir. 1997).
31. See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 405 (9th Cir. 1996).
32. See Okla. Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 605 F.2d 1155, 1159
(10th Cir. 1979); Ronzio v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th
Cir. 1940).
33. See Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 475, 482 (M.D.N.C.
1998) (applying a "flexible approach" that is closely aligned with the either party
viewpoint, if not identical).
[Vol. 69
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either the plaintiff or the defendant. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits have not
consistently applied any particular viewpoint.
The Eighth Circuit traditionally values the amount in controversy from the
plaintiff's viewpoint,34 but its decisions tease defendants with dicta and footnotes
suggesting that it may consider the defendant's viewpoint under the right
circumstances.3" Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.36 was perhaps the
Eighth Circuit's closest flirtation with considering the defendant's viewpoint.
The Hatridge court voiced approval for the defendant's viewpoint, but
safeguarded its decision by holding that Mr. and Mrs. Hatridge had a common,
undivided interest, and the aggregate value of their claims exceeded the
jurisdictional amount.37 The court refused to sever Mrs. Hatridge's loss of
consortium claim against Aetna from her husband's personal injury claim against
Aetna.3 The court also provided a few examples of when it would consider the
plaintiff's viewpoint and factors that might warrant consideration of the
defendant's viewpoint.39 The court explained that when the plaintiff seeks only
recovery of money, the plaintiff's viewpoint is ordinarily appropriate.' But it
found a compelling case for using the defendant's viewpoint when the defendant
34. The Eighth Circuit allows compensatory damages, the value ofinjunctive relief,
punitive damages and attorneys fees to go toward establishing the amount in controversy.
See Allison v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir. 1992) (punitive
damages); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Miles, 978 F.2d 437, 438 (8th Cir. 1992) (attorneys
fees); Bums v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1987) (value of
injunctive relief).
35. See Brittain Shaw McInnis, Comment, The $75,000.01 Question: What Is the
Value of Injunctive Relief., 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1013, 1047 n.52 (1998). Mclnnis
views the Eighth Circuit as internally split, but this Law Summary offers an additional
possibility. The Eighth Circuit may be willing to consider other viewpoints and is merely
waiting for the perfect case to explain its position. In the meantime, perhaps it is not that
the lower courts are split; the circuit as a whole might consider differing viewpoints in
certain types of cases. For example, courts in the Eighth Circuit consistently refuse to
consider the defendant's viewpoint in class actions. See infra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text.
36. 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969).
37. Id. at 815-16. After stating its approval of the defendant's viewpoint rule and
explaining how defendant Aetna's liability would far exceed the amount in controversy
despite the fact that Mrs. Hatridge requested less than the jurisdictional amount, the court
retreated from the defendant's viewpoint. Id. It stated that "we do not feel free to place
particular reliance, in our present decision, upon the cases, such as Ronzio, which utilize
the defendant's standpoint approach. Instead, we rest our decision upon the nature of
Mrs. Hatridge's claim and its inescapable dependency upon that of her husband." Id. at
816.
38. Id.
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seeks removal and when the value to the defendant exceeds the value to the
plaintiff."' By acknowledging the defendant's viewpoint, yet refusing to rest its
holding on that point, the Eighth Circuit left the lower courts without a clear
answer to the viewpoint debate.
In Hedberg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Eighth
Circuit discussed how the viewpoint it was willing to consider depended on the
type of relief requested.42 Where the plaintiff seeks a money judgment, the
amount in controversy is "the sum claimed by the plaintiff' as long as the
plaintiff claims that amount in good faith.43 For injunctive requests the amount
in controversy is generally the value of "the right sought to be gained by the
plaintiff," but the court stated that the "cost to the defendant has also been
suggested as an alternative basis."" The court found ample evidence that the
claim for injunctive relief satisfied the amount in controversy.45 Although the
court measured the value of the claim by the economic injury to the plaintiffs, its
mention of the defendant's view suggests that the Eighth Circuit might be willing
to consider the defendant's viewpoint in an appropriate case. Hedberg, like
Hatridge, left no clear rule for the lower courts to follow."
The Eighth Circuit's viewpoint analysis becomes more complex in the
context of class actions where the claims of class members may not be
aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount.47 The non-aggregation rule is
41. Id. at 815.
42. Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924, 928-29 (8th Cir.
1965).
43. Id. Hedberg involved a request for an injunction to prevent a former employee
from soliciting State Farm's present customers as well as a request for replevin of certain
records and materials. Id.
44.
Id. at 928. In addition, the Hatridge court found Supreme Court authority for the either
party viewpoint in Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 175 (1889) ("It is conceded that the
pecuniary value of the matter is dispute may be determined . . . in some cases
... by the pecuniary result to one of the parties immediately from the judgment.").
Several other Eighth Circuit cases suggest the possibility of valuing the amount in
controversy from either viewpoint. See Cowell v. City Water Supply Co., 121 F. 53, 57
(8th Cir. 1903) ("[Ilt is the amount or value of that which the complainant claims to
recover, or the sum or value of that which the defendant will lose if the complainant
succeeds in his suit, that constitutes the jurisdictional sum or value of the matter in
dispute, which tests thejurisdition... ."); see also Hedberg, 350 F.2d at 928; Miller v.
First Serv. Corp., 84 F.2d 680,681 (8th Cir. 1965); Elliott v. Empire Gas Co., 4 F.2d 493,
500-01 (8th Cir. 1925).
45. Id. at 929. The court ignored the replevin claim because the value of the
documents was questionable. Id.
46. Smith v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 249 F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 2001);
Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969).
47. See infra Part IV.C. The non-aggregation rule is discussed in Zahn v.
[Vol. 69
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particularly difficult to reconcile with the defendant's viewpoint, and the Eighth
Circuit seems fairly committed to the plaintiff's viewpoint for class actions. In
Massachusetts State PharmaceuticalAss 'n v. Federal Prescription Service, Inc.,
just one year after Hatridge, the Eighth Circuit refused to apply the defendant's
viewpoint. 3 In Federal Prescription Service, the pharmacist plaintiffs could not
maintain a class action because they failed to establish how much business they
lost, either individually or as a class, due to the defendant's actions.49 The court
made a broad statement that the "amount in controversy is tested by the value of
the suit's intended benefit to the plaintiff," and then it addressed the defendant's
viewpoint in a footnote." The court interpreted the non-aggregation rule to
prevent application of the defendant's viewpoint to boost the value of the
controversy in class actions to the jurisdictional amount."'
Litigation over the viewpoint used to measure the amount in controversy
gained momentum only recently in federal courts in Missouri. Until the past
decade, most of Missouri's case law on the issue dated back over half a century.
In 1949, before either Hatridge or Hedberg, one Missouri district court applied
the defendant's viewpoint and valued the amount in controversy according to the
defendant's cost of establishing a trust flnd..2 The court in Shipe v. Floral Hills
ultimately dismissed the case, not for failure to meet the amount in controversy,
but for lack of diversity in citizenship." The Shipe court measured the amount
in controversy by the "pecuniary result[] to either party," and found that from the
defendant's perspective, the amount exceeded the jurisdictional requirement.14
Significantly, the court couched its language regarding the amount in controversy
in terms of the cost to the defendant in establishing the fund." Application of the
defendant's viewpoint in Shipe is particularly noteworthy because the plaintiff
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,300 (1973), and Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,
338 (1969).
48. Mass. State Pharm. Ass'n v. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130 (8th
Cir. 1970).
49. Id. at 133.
50. Id. at 132.
51. Id. at 132n.1.
52. Shipe v. Floral Hills, 86 F. Supp. 985, 987 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
53. Id. at 988.
54. Id. at 987.
55. Id. The court first discussed the plaintiff's contention that the "defendant
agreed to establish an irrevocable 'Perpetual Care Trust Fund' and deposit. . . ten
percent (10%) of [the defendant's profits]." Id. at 986. The opinion then states the
amount in controversy as "the 'trust fund' defendant promised to establish." Id. at 987.
The court applied the "pecuniary result to either party" standard and stated that if the
plaintiff s contentions were true, the "pecuniary result to the defendant" would be fifty
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requested monetary damages, as opposed to equitable relief, which is often
difficult to translate into dollar value. 6 The court concluded that if the plaintiff's
contentions were correct, the "pecuniary result to the defendant" would exceed
the jurisdictional amount.5 7 Although the value of the trust find would likely be
the same to both the defendant and the plaintiff, the language of the opinion
reveals the court's willingness to consider the defendant's viewpoint, even when
the relief requested is monetary damages, not an equitable remedy. 8
Perhaps the Eighth Circuit's decisions are purposely unclear because of the
lack of clarity in the Supreme Court opinions regarding the viewpoint
controversy. Because the Eighth Circuit lacks a clear precedent to follow, it
makes sense that the Eighth Circuit might purposely use hazy language as a
precaution against later reversal. Although its opinions are most consistent with
the plaintiff's viewpoint, the Eighth Circuit remains one of the few jurisdictions
that has not formally declared whose viewpoint may be considered in removal
actions.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Decisions by Missouri Federal Courts
Forced to make a decision about whose viewpoint can properly be
considered in a removal action, the lower courts in the Eighth Circuit have
reached varied and inconsistent conclusions. In Missouri, the courts have
responded favorably to both the either party viewpoint and the party seeking
jurisdiction viewpoint.
In 1989, in Solna, Inc. v. American Printing Equipment, Inc.," the Western
District applied the party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint in a request for a
declaratory judgment. The Solna court noted the Eighth Circuit's statement in
Hatridge that no "hard and fast rule governs" which viewpoint the court should
consider to determine the amount in controversy.' Taking those words to mean
that the court had discretion to choose which viewpoint to consider, the Solna
56. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Crenshaw v.
Great Cent. Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1973); Davenport v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1957).
57. Shipe, 86 F. Supp. at 987.
58. The monetary value ofthis contract claim was arguably easier to determine than
other remedies, such as injunctive relief or specific performance of the contract. If the
court is willing to consider the defendant's view for a claim where there is no real need
to diverge from the plaintiff's view, there seems little reason why the district court would
not consider the defendant's viewpoint when the plaintiff requests equitable remedies.
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court allowed the value to the defendant to push the plaintiffs claim over the
threshold jurisdictional amount.6' The court reasoned that if it only considered
the plaintiffs viewpoint, the plaintiffwould be allowed to set forth its own theory
of the amount of damages, which would essentially bind the parties and the
court.62 By giving the plaintiff the power to set the jurisdictional amount, the
plaintiff could manipulate and tweak the value to remain just below the
jurisdictional amount.63 The court found that result undesirable and declined to
extend so much power and control to the plaintiff." Instead, the court applied the
party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint in an effort to avoid gamesmanship and
manipulation by the plaintiff.6" Since it is the defendant who seeks to establish
federal jurisdiction in removal actions, the court determined the jurisdictional
amount from the defendant's viewpoint."
A more recent decision implicitly affirns the Western District's willingness
to consider the defendant's perspective, but applies Solna's reasoning in a new
context: requests for injunctive relief.6 In Radmer v. Aid Ass 'nfor Lutherans,
the court stated that although the defendant could not aggregate the class action
plaintiffs' damages, federal jurisdiction would have been proper if the
defendant's cost of compliance with each plaintiffs claim exceeded the
jurisdictional amount.6" The court explained the non-aggregation rule by saying
that the "costs to a defendant of complying with court-ordered injunctive relief
may not be viewed as a whole; rather, a defendant 'is deemed to face multiple
claims for injunctive relief, each of which must be separately evaluated." 9 In
effect, the court said it would allow the defendant's viewpoint to determine the
amount in controversy, but the value to the defendant must be apportioned among
the plaintiffs. The decision reveals two significant elements of the court's
viewpoint approach: (1) the non-aggregation rule for class action plaintiffs
applies even in cases where the court considers the defendant's viewpoint and (2)
the defendant's cost of compliance with injunctive relief can be used to satisfy
the amount in controversy for removal.
61. Id.




66. 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3703, at 125.
67. Radmer v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, No. 99-0961-CV-W-9-4, 2000 WL
33910093 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2000).
68. Id. at *3 (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d
599, 610 (7th Cir. 1997)).
69. Id. (quoting Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 610). The Brand Name court allowed
the defendant's costs of compliance to satisfy the jurisdictional amount, stating, "The




Hininger: Hininger: Two Heads Are Better than One:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
Unfortunately, the Radmer court never distinguished whether it was
applying the party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint or the either party viewpoint.
The court would have considered the defendant's viewpoint (the defendant was
seeking jurisdiction) but does not say whether it would also consider the
plaintiff's viewpoint (the either party viewpoint). What can be read from the
Radmer decision is that, under appropriate circumstances, the defendant's
viewpoint deserves consideration.
The Radmer and Solna decisions, together, leave two questions unanswered.
First, does the Western District now follow the party seeking jurisdiction
viewpoint or the either party viewpoint? Second, will the Western District
consider the defendant's viewpoint where the requested relief is not injunctive
or declaratory?
B. Congressional Action to Expand Federal Jurisdiction
Over Class Actions
For the past four years, Congress has responded to the viewpoint
controversy by proposing legislation to change the removal standard for class
actions." Although class actions encompass only a segment of the overall
viewpoint debate, the purposes and policies fueling the legislation coincide with
the policies at issue in the broader context.
With a few minor exceptions, the proposed legislation would permit removal
of any class action with an aggregate value that exceeds five million dollars and
involves more than one hundred class members.7 Both the Senate and House
bills have almost identical provisions for removal. Instead of complete diversity,
federal jurisdiction would require only that one plaintiff and one defendant be
citizens of different states. 2 The Senate explained the need for federal court
jurisdiction over class actions in the Findings and Purposes section of the bill:
(4) Abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial system
... and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the firamers
of the United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are-
70. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong. §§ 4-5 (2004);
Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. §§ 4-5 (2003); Class Action
Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. §§ 4-5 (2003); Class Action Fairness Act
of 2002, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. §§ 4-5 (2001); Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, S.
1712, 107th Cong. §§ 4-5 (2001).
71. See S. 2062 § 4(a); S. 274 § 4(a); H.R. 1115 § 4(a); S. 1712 § 4(a); H.R. 2341
§ 4(a). Originally, the threshold was two million dollars, but the Act was amended to
five million dollars. See Bill Tracking H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003); 149 CONG. REC.
H5296 (June 12, 2003).
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(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court;
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against
out-of-State defendants; and
(C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States
and bind the rights of the residents of those States."
The House agreed that federal jurisdiction over class actions was necessary
to prevent abuses of the system by plaintiffs who now avoid litigating in federal
courts through the use of "artful pleading." '74 The bill notes that local courts may
give less consideration to the merits of the case, may exhibit bias against out-of-
state defendants and may impose their own view of other states' laws on the
parties." The House approved the Act on June 12, 2003.76
The American Bar Association ("ABA") responded to Congress's initiative
by forming its own class action task force to investigate." After gathering
information about the pros and cons of the proposed legislation, the task force
urged Congress to consider several factors before widely expanding federal
jurisdiction over class actions.7" The ABA thought the need to expand federal
jurisdiction hinged upon "the total amount of money involved in the dispute, the
existence of overlapping classes or cases, the number of plaintiffs in the alleged
class and the percentage of those plaintiffs who claim as their home the state in
which the suit is pending."79 The ABA scheduled the task force to continue its
investigation through August 2003.8 After considering the task force results, the
ABA plans to propose a resolution for its own delegates to vote to determine the
ABA's official position.8
73. S. 2062 § 2(a)(4).
74. H.R. 1115 § 2(a)(4).
75. Id. § 2(a)(5).
76. Bill Tracking H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003); 149 CoNG. REc. H5306 (June
12,2003); Bill Tracking S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004). In the House, 253 representatives
voted for passage, and 170 voted against passage. The Senate introduced the bill on
February 4, 2003. Bill Tracking S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003). The Senate filed a report
on the bill, but did not vote on the bill in 2003. Id.; 149 CoNG. REc. S10,616 (July 31,
2003); S. REP. No. 108-123 (July 31, 2003). It was introduced in the Senate again on
February 10, 2004. Bill Tracking S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004).
77. The ABA appointed the task force in the Fall of 2001 and current President
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr. extended the term of the task force through August 2003. Patricia
Manson, Lawyers Fret over Shifting Class Actions to Federal Court, 149 CHI. DAILY




81. Id. The task force was generally supportive of expanding federal jurisdiction
over interstate class actions claims, but cautioned the legislature against stripping state
courts of their ability to hear claims where the state interest outweighed the federal
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These recent cases and congressional actions reflect the controversial and
timely nature of the viewpoint debate. That debate is likely to continue until
either the Supreme Court takes a definite stance or until Congress passes
legislation.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. A Necessary Distinction: Equitable Versus Legal Remedies
Equitable remedies are inherently more difficult to value than monetary
damages. Injunctive relief is often requested in two situations: (1) when
monetary damages fail to adequately compensate the plaintiff, or (2) when the
amount of money required to return the plaintiff to her rightful position is too
speculative or difficult to convert to a monetary amount.82 The court's initial
determination that money is an inadequate substitute for the harm done or that the
harm cannot be converted to a dollar figure makes it inherently more difficult for
the court to place a dollar value on the controversy for jurisdictional purposes."3
One reason that it is so much harder to value injunctive relief in monetary
terms is because the value can be different for each party involved. One
proponent of the either party viewpoint suggests that this disjunction in value is
most extreme in cases where an injunction would force the defendant to
substantially alter its business practices, to forego valuable opportunities, or to
comply with burdensome administrative tasks." In these situations, the benefit
to the individual plaintiff might be relatively minor, but the costs of compliance
to the defendant might be incredibly large. It is easy to contemplate a scenario
where the parties' individual estimates of the value of the injunctive relief might
fall on either side of the seventy-five thousand dollar threshold. How should the
court choose the side of the threshold on which the case rightfully belongs?
A court might apply one viewpoint when a plaintiff requests equitable relief
and another viewpoint when a plaintiff requests monetary relief. This may be
an appropriate distinction to make. Where a plaintiff requests one thousand
dollars in monetary damages, it makes sense for the court to presume the amount
in controversy is the same for each party: the plaintiff stands to gain one
interest. Id.
82. For a discussion of the historical evolution of legal and equitable remedies, see
JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVaL PROCEDURE 490 (6th ed. 1993) ("[The availability of
specific relief through the injunction or specific performance when compensatory relief
through a judgment for damages would be inadequate was the chief basis for drawing
common-law causes into equity. As a result equity now dominates many areas of
controversy originally governed by the common law, because damages are an impotent
remedy in such cases; a good example is nuisance.").
83. See McInnis, supra note 35, at 1014-15.
84. Id. at 1015.
(Vol. 69
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/12
REMOVAL
thousand dollars and the defendant stands to lose one thousand dollars.
However, with injunctive relief, it is much more appropriate to look beyond the
plaintiff's viewpoint because the value of that injunction is not the same for both
parties. As a result, practitioners must scrutinize court decisions to deduce the
scope of their jurisdiction's particular viewpoint.
B. Comparing and Contrasting the Three Viewpoints
1. Is the Plaintiff the Master of the Forum or Merely Forum Shopping?
The policy rationale for valuing the claim from the plaintiff s viewpoint rests
on the historical and traditional notion that the plaintiff is the master of the
forum. 5 Being master of the forum entitles the plaintiffto select the court system
in which she chooses to bring the claim."6 Although the removal statute offers
protection to defendants, it also embraces the master of the forum doctrine by
imposing conditions on the defendant's ability to remove.
Some of those limitations are quite severe. Section 1441 requires
defendants to file for removal within sixty days of the case becoming
removable.87 The statute cuts off removal after one year, regardless of the
plaintiff's amendments to the complaint or parties that may drop from the case. 8
This limitation permits some manipulation of rules to defeat removal. The
plaintiff can initially undervalue the claim or add defendants to defeat diversity
of citizenship and then later amend the complaint to increase the stakes or to drop
a defendant.8 9 As long as the plaintiff waits until after the one-year cutoff to
amend, the defendant will be powerless to remove the case even if there is
diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy that exceeds the
jurisdictional amount." In addition, the Supreme Court strictly construes
removal statutes against removal and in favor of remand.91 Erecting a high
hurdle for removal not only reduces the number of claims that defendants can
85. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411-12 (5th Cir. 1995) (requiring the
defendant to show the threshold jurisdictional amount is a "legal certainty" in order to
overcome the presumption that the plaintiff's alleged damage figure is accurate).
86. 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3725, at 95.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(3) (2000).
88. See id. § 1446.
89. Id. (Commentary on 1988 Revision to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, at 3-4).
90. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3725, at 86-87.
91. See Shamrock Oil & Gas v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) ("[T]he policy
of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one
calling for the strict construction of such legislation."); Eastas v. Blue Bell Creameries,
97 F.3d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1996) (removal statutes should be strictly construed against
removal and in favor of remand).
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successfully remove, it also discourages defendants from taking the time and
effort to even attempt to remove claims.
Cases of large value to only the defendant cannot be removed under the
plaintiff's viewpoint, which defeats Congress's goal of providing federal
jurisdiction to claims of large value.92 As a result, defendants have less
protection against the possibility of local bias.93 Historically, federal diversity
jurisdiction served the purpose of "secur[ing] a tribunal presumed to be more
impartial than a court of the state in which one of the litigants resides." 4
Diversity jurisdiction was created to protect out-of-state defendants from the
potential favoritism toward local residents by both the juries"' and state
legislatures.9'
Application of the plaintiff's viewpoint keeps large claims out of federal
court when they properly belong there. By ignoring the defendant's stake in the
litigation, the plaintiff's viewpoint encourages the plaintiff to play procedural
games to avoid removal and gives defendants little protection against forum
shopping.
2. Reaching a Fair and Efficient Decision
Two important considerations in choosing a particular viewpoint are (1)
fairness to the parties and (2) efficient administration of claims. The viewpoint
choice should hinge on fairness to both parties and on reducing the possibility of
92. See BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 553 (7th Cir. 2002);
In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 264 F.3d 952,961 (9th Cir. 2001); Hatridge
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1969).
93. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
94. Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898); see also Pease v.
Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1855) ("The theory upon which jurisdiction is
conferred on the courts ofthe United States, in controversies between citizens of different
States, has its foundation in the supposition that, possibly, the state tribunal might not be
impartial between their own citizens and foreigners."); Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-
Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 797 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("An important historical justification for
diversity jurisdiction is the reassurance of fairness and competence that a federal court
can supply to an out-of-state defendant facing suit in state court."); In re Prudential Ins.
Co. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 305 (3d Cir. 1998).
95. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases
Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 424-25
(1992) (practitioners believe federal courts have a higher quality jury pool than state
courts); Mclnnis, supra note 35, at 1028 (arguing that larger jury venire and higher per
diem might explain higher quality of federal jurors).
96. McInnis, supra note 35, at 1024. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (2d ed. 1970); John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity
Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 9-12 (1963-64); Henry Friendly, The Historical Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483,495 (1927-28).
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bias. Because consideration of only the plaintiff's viewpoint decreases the
number of claims the defendant can remove from state court to federal court,
potential bias against defendants in state courts becomes significant. With
respect to the numerous class action filings against insurance companies in
Southern Illinois state courts, one study found:
The willingness of certain Illinois state courts to serve as free-roving
insurance commissioners and issue edicts that affect the way insurance
companies can do business in forty-nine other states may explain why
twenty-six class action lawsuits have been filed in Madison County
against insurance companies in the last few years."
Explaining how the rules encouraged forum shopping by plaintiffs and
produced inequitable results, the study said that "'one Madison County judge
could be single-handedly responsible for dramatically increasing the price of
automobile insurance . . . and adversely affecting the . . . automobile parts
industry."' 98 The study raised additional questions about whether a state judge
would actually enforce the interests of the public at large where the claim
affected nationwide interests." Elected state court judges as opposed to federal
judges who have life tenure"° may be more at risk of subconsciously or
intentionally favoring their own constituents' views over those of outsiders.'0 '
Considering that one of the purposes of diversity jurisdiction is to reduce bias
against the defendant, using the plaintiff's viewpoint seems particularly flawed.
The risk of bias is especially troublesome to large corporate defendants.
Large corporations often engage in business in all fifty states and risk suit
anywhere in the country. Attorneys who represent multiple plaintiffs might be
encouraged by defendants' lack of removal power to shop for the forum with the
most favorable local rules or the judge with the most generous track record.
97. Brief of Amicus Curiae State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ford Motor Co. v.
McCauley, 537 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 01-896), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
available at 2002 WL 976473, at *13 (quoting John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson
Miller, They're Making a Federal Case Out of It... in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 143, 151 (2002)).
98. Id. at *24-25 (quoting Beisner & Miller, supra note 97, at 151).
99. "'The ability of one locally elected judge to exercise that much power raises
serious federalism questions."' Id. (quoting Beisner & Miller, supra note 97, at 151).
100. Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Judges, both of
the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office."
101. See Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120-21
(1977) (finding that elected state judges are more affected by majoritarian pressure than
the life tenured federal judges).
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Upsetting the balance of power between the federal and state governments
and the balance of power from state to state is a closely related concern.
Application of the plaintiff's viewpoint raises the policy question of whether a
state court should decide claims where the outcome could affect the practices and
policies of companies engaging in interstate commerce. This federalism concern
arises particularly in cases where the plaintiffrequests injunctive relief that would
alter the national policy of a large corporation or affect the commercial activities
of residents of several states. In an amicus brief filed in Ford Motor Co. v.
McCauley, State Farm argued that the plaintiff's viewpoint rule keeps large
claims with far-reaching effects from being litigated in federal court, where they
properly belong:
When a single state court judge, elected by the voters of a single
county, adjudicates the claims of a nationwide class of policyholders,
there is a serious risk that the resulting judgment may impinge upon the
prerogative of other states to regulate the business of insurance within
their own borders." 2
In addition to federalism concerns, the unfamiliar procedural rules of the
state court system may unfairly prejudice the defendant.0 3 At the very least, the
defendant's lack of familiarity with the local rules and procedures in various state
courts could drive up research costs for the defendant. The difference in local
court rules and procedures also creates the potential for resident-friendly rules
and may encourage plaintiffs to attempt to set procedural traps for defendants.'O°
The mere potential for bias has a chilling effect on interstate commerce.' 5
Businesses may limit their business operations to avoid states where the owners
suspect or perceive procedural unfairness.'"
In contrast, the federal courts may provide a better, more efficient
adjudication than state courts. Federal judges can consolidate federal cases for
102. Brief of Amicus Curiae at *2, McCauley (No. 01-896).
103. But defendants could obtain local counsel or at least require their attorneys
to refer to the local rules of the court. In addition, the plaintiffs' attorney may be less
familiar with federal procedure and may be disadvantaged if removal is granted.
104. See generally Miller, supra note 95, at 400-23 (empirical study shows that
perceptions of local bias in state courts still exist); McInnis, supra note 35, at 1014-15.
105. See William L. Marbury, Why Should We Limit Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A. J. 379, 380 (1960) (access to federal courts through diversityjurisdiction encourages business); Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat
of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 197, 209-10 (1982) (if diversityjurisdiction were abolished, it would "chill entrepreneurial interstate investment").
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pre-trial proceedings, unlike their state counterparts. 7 Several commentators
suggest that federal courts are more accustomed to large cases and have more
resources to devote to complex litigation.0 8 Proponents of strict removal
limitations attempt to justify their view by pointing to the overloaded and
backlogged federal court dockets. 9 Thatjustification is not convincing because
state courts are similarly backlogged and the federal court system often has more
resources and flexibility to deal with a loaded docket."'
Allowing federal judges to exercise jurisdiction serves the dual purpose of
assuring nonresidents the freedom from "susceptibility to local bias" as well as
protecting the federal system by placing the decision in the hands of a federal
official."'
3. Consistency With Statutory Language, Case Law, and
Congressional Intent
The either party viewpoint is consistent with the language of the federal
statute outlining the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Section 1332 does
not expressly or implicitly require relief to be measured from the viewpoint of
any particular party." 2 Because of this, the broad interpretation allowing
consideration of either party's viewpoint is probably most consistent with the
plain language of the statute." 3
The either party viewpoint is also in accord with the Supreme Court's broad,
general test for determining the amount in controversy. In Hunt v. Washington
Apple Commission, the Supreme Court stated that "the amount in controversy is
measured by the value of the object of the litigation,"''" and in Thomas v. Gaskill
107. Manson, supra note 77. While a few states do allow state court judges to
consolidate cases within the state for pretrial proceedings, no state judge can consolidate
claims brought in different states. Id. (citing Memorandum from Judge David F. Levi,
to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee of the A.B.A.).
108. See Miller, supra note 95, at 407-20 (empirical study finding that practitioners
view federal courts as more just and less biased than state courts). Admittedly, it is
sometimes the federal judges who sing their own praises. See RICHARD A. POsNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsIs AND REFORM 139-41 (1985).
109. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3725, at 96.
110. Federal courts have clerks, while many state courts do not. Beisner & Miller,
supra note 97, at 151. Federal courts have more flexibility than state courts to send cases
to other courts or to join similar claims. Id. Federal courts are arguably more
accustomed to dealing with large and complex claims than state courts. Id.
111. Brief of Amicus Curiae State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ford Motor Co. v.
McCauley, 537 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 01-896), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
available at 2002 WL 976473, at *21.
112. Id. at *7.
113. See id.
114. Hunt v. Wash. Apple Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977).
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that generally, the value is measured by the "pecuniary consequence to those
involved in the litigation.""' 5 The Supreme Court's refusal to either adopt or
prohibit a particular viewpoint suggests that the broad and flexible approach of
the either party viewpoint is most appropriate. In addition, the either party
viewpoint comes the closest to reconciling the scattered case law, in which lower
courts have considered the plaintiff's viewpoint in some cases and the
defendant's viewpoint in other cases. The either party viewpoint also coincides
with recent Senate and House bills that would expand federal court jurisdiction
to almost any case where the pooled value of the plaintiff's claims exceeds five
million dollars and there are more than one hundred class members." 6
In contrast, application of the party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint is less
consistent with the principles behind removal. Although none of the circuits
have adopted the party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint, several decisions at least
pay lip service to the view, and some lower courts decisions appear to rest on the
viewpoint." 7
At first glance it seems logical that the amount in controversy should be
measured from the viewpoint of the party saddled with the burden of establishing
jurisdiction."' The court typically rules on removal long before the parties have
a chance to conduct thorough discovery, so the court should accept the value
from the defendant's view because that is the evidence most accessible to the
defendant." "9 Allowing the defendant to use his own view of the cost of the claim
may reflect a more accurate value of the claim because the defendant will not
have to speculate as to the possible benefit to the plaintiff.20 However, if a case
filed in federal court by the plaintiff is remanded for failure to establish the
amount in controversy (judged by the plaintiff's viewpoint), the defendant could
in some cases immediately remove it, using the value to the defendant.''
115. Thomas v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 447 (1942).
116. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
117. For courts following the party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint, see Bergstrom
v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 895 F. Supp. 257, 262 (D.N.D. 1995); Solna, Inc. v. Am.
Printing Equip., Inc., No. 89-0715-CV-W-5, 1989 WL 325976 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 20,
1989); Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enters. Div., Consol. Foods Corp., 369 F. Supp.
766 (D. Ky. 1973); Inman v. Milwhite Co., 261 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Ark. 1966).
118. In Bergstrom v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., the court noted: "When
the burden rests upon the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction, plaintiff is allowed to proceed
if it appears the amount claimed is made in good faith. The same should be true for the
defendant's allegations of its costs to satisfy a requested equitable relief." Bergstom, 895
F. Supp. at 259 (citations omitted).
119. See id. at 262.
120. See id.
121. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 102.109[5]
(3d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1997).
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This result is troubling because the ability to remove a case depends on
whether it could have initially been filed in federal court by the plaintiff. The
removal statute refers back to the diversity statute.'22 One would expect that
cross-referencing to produce a uniform result: the removal statute allows
removal of any case that could originally have been brought in federal court. But
under the party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint, a defendant might be able to
remove a case to federal court that the plaintiff could not have initially filed there.
The plaintiff's viewpoint is also troublesome because it excludes high-value
claims from adjudication in federal court. Even if the plaintiff is acting in good
faith, the value of the case may exceed seventy-five thousand dollars for the
defendant yet still be excluded from federal court."2 While the purpose of an
amount in controversy limitation is to keep trivial claims out of federal court, 24
the plaintiff's viewpoint also keeps out cases where large sums of the defendant's
money are involved. The plaintiffs viewpoint fails to accurately assess the
actual amount of money at stake in many cases. The plaintiffs viewpoint
"ignores the real, substantial costs that are at issue" and "exaggerates the
possibilities for manipulation of the amount in controversy." '25
C. Problems Unique to Class Actions: The Non-Aggregation Rule
The non-aggregation rule presents a potential conflict with the either party
viewpoint or the party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint, but it is a conflict that is
easily resolved. The non-aggregation rule states that the claims of class members
may not be aggregated to meet the minimum jurisdictional amount. 2 A narrow
exception to the non-aggregation rule is where a class of plaintiffs seeks to
enforce a common and undivided right.'27 Federal court interpretations of a
common and undivided right vary,'28 particularly when the plaintiffs seek
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
123. A court's refusal to consider the cost of compliance to the defendant results
in an "artificially low amount in controversy." Brief of Amicus Curiae State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley, 537 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 01-896), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, available at 2002 WL 976473, at *3. For a
transcript of the oral argument, see Oral Argument (Oct. 7, 2002), McCauley (No. 01-
896), available at 2002 WL 31309171.
124. See infra note 92.
125. Id. at *9.
126. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,
338 (1969).
127. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335.
128. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's position (from a Missouri federal
district court) on common, undivided rights and application of the non-aggregation rule,
see Visintine v. Saab Auto. A.B., 891 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
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injunctive relief.29 The Eighth Circuit defines the common, undivided right very
narrowly. 
30
Critics argue that the either party or party seeking jurisdiction viewpoint
would necessarily allow defendants to aggregate the class members' claims and
violate the non-aggregation rule of Zahn and Snyder.' 31 Some courts have
resolved this problem by adopting the plaintiff's viewpoint in class actions.
Were the court to consider the amount in controversy from the
defendant's viewpoint, the rule against nonaggregation could be
circumvented. A defendant should not be able to aggregate its
potential cost of complying with injunctive relief sought by multiple
plaintiffs in order to obtain a federal forum when the [individual]
Plaintiffs cannot do so relative to their claims.'32
This quote reflects a rule of fairness: if plaintiffs cannot aggregate their own
claims to establish federal jurisdictional then defendants should not be allowed
to aggregate those claims for removal to federal court.
The Third and Eleventh Circuits rejected consideration of the defendant's
viewpoint in class actions 33 but the Seventh Circuit allowed the defendant's cost
of compliance to provide a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. 34
For courts willing to consider the value of the claim to the defendant, three
options exist: (1) apportion the value to the defendant among the plaintiffs, (2)
rule that the non-aggregation rule does not apply, or (3) expand the definition of
what constitutes a common and undivided right. Among courts that permit
consideration of the defendant's viewpoint in class actions, the first option,
requiring the defendant to prorate its compliance costs among all class members,
129. McIntire v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 911, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
130. See Radmer v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, No. 99-0961 -CV-W-9-4, 2000 WL
33910093, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2000). The Radmer court rejected the view that if
a single plaintiff could bring the claim alone and receive an injunction, then the right is
a single, undivided right. Id. Instead, the right is only single and undivided (and
therefore allows the defendant to aggregate) when one plaintiff could not bring the claim
alone, without "implicating the rights of other class members." Id. (citing Bishop v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 925 F. Supp. 294, 298 (D.N.J. 1996)). The Radmer court derived this test
from the Bishop case and a previous Eighth Circuit opinion. See Burns v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1987).
131. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 294-95; Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338.
132. Mclntire, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (alteration in original) (quoting Nelson v.
Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (W.D. Mich. 2000)).
133. See Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir. 2000);
Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir. 1993).
134. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 609-
10 (7th Cir. 1997).
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is most prevalent.' However, the pro rata approach creates a bizarre result that
is inconsistent with the traditional goal of an amount in controversy-to keep
trivial claims out of federal court. Under the apportionment approach, the more
plaintiffs that join a class action, the less likely the defendant is to satisfy the
amount in controversy. Logic would dictate that the more parties a suit involves,
the larger the stakes of litigation typically become. But the result of
apportionment is that the largest class action cases are virtually guaranteed to fail
to satisfy the amount in controversy and are doomed to remain in state court.'36
The~second approach has been to narrowly interpret the non-aggregation
rule in Zahn and Snyder as inapplicable to valuing injunctive relief.'37 This
approach applies the non-aggregation rule to claims for compensatory damages,
but does not apply the rule to claims for injunctive relief.38 It may be appropriate
to distinguish monetary relief from injunctive relief in class actions because the
result to the defendant is often the same for injunctive relief, no matter how many
plaintiffs join the action. For example, if each plaintiff requests one thousand
dollars in monetary relief, then it would take seventy-six plaintiffs to establish the
requisite amount in controversy. Since the non-aggregation rule prevents
plaintiffs from pooling their claims to establish federal court jurisdiction, the
court should also refuse to allow the defendant to pool those claims to establish
jurisdiction for removal. However, when several plaintiffs seek the same
injunctive relief, the result to the defendant is the same no matter how many
plaintiffs join the action. In that case, there is no aggregation involved; the cost
of compliance to the defendant is the same as if one plaintiff requested the relief.
Therefore, it may be perfectly legitimate to conclude that the non-aggregation
rule does not apply to class action requests for injunctive relief.
135. Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1977); Mclntire, 142
F. Supp. 2d at 923.
136. See Brief of Amicus Curiae State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ford Motor Co.
v. McCauley, 537 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 01-896), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
available at 2002 WL 976473, at *7.
137. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,295 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332, 338 (1969).
138. For courts that follow this approach, see Justice v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 927 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that claims for compensatory
damages could not be aggregated, but affirming the district court's ruling that the
plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, measured with regard to the defendant's cost of
compliance, satisfied the jurisdictional minimum and were properly removed); and
McCoy v. Erie Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481, 492 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) (finding that the
"amount in controversy can be satisfied by demonstrating that the injunctive relief would
require the defendant to alter his method of doing business in such a manner that would
cost at least the statutory minimum"). In McCoy, the court stated that it "makes little
sense" to "require[] that the amount in controversy be satisfied even after the financial
burden to the defendant is apportioned to each plaintiff." Id. at 494 n. 14.
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The courts' third response to the non-aggregation rule is to expand the scope
of the rule's exception. Courts following this approach define a "common and
undivided interest" to include claims where the remedy would be the same no
matter how many plaintiffs joined the suit.139 An injunction is a common interest
because it would "benefit the putative class as a whole and not just any individual
plaintiff."'' " Those courts reason that the defendant would sustain the loss even
if only one plaintiff were to obtain the injunction.' 4
These final two approaches seem the most consistent with the principles of
non-aggregation and also serve the general interests of allowing larger claims
into federal court while relegating claims of lower monetary value to state courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The either party viewpoint is the most consistent with the broad, general
wording of the diversity and removal statutes and best captures its two goals: (1)
to prevent local bias against defendants where the stakes of litigation are high,
and (2) to protect the plaintiff's choice of forum where the monetary value is less
significant.
The defendant stands to lose one hundred percent of what the litigation will
cost her, just as the plaintiff stands to gain one hundred percent of the benefit of
the claim from his viewpoint. Since the goal of the jurisdictional statutes is to
offer a balanced protection to both the plaintiff and the defendant, it is illogical
for a court to allow the plaintiff's viewpoint to trump the defendant's viewpoint.
The plaintiff's viewpoint improperly places the plaintiff's claim on a pedestal and
139. See Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 599 (applying the "one plaintiff' test); In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 836 (E.D. Mich. 1999) ("Plaintiffs
seek injunctive relief that will benefit the class as a whole. Defendants' costs of
compliance do not depend upon the size of the class or the identity of its members.
Accordingly, it is based upon a common and undivided interest and constitutes an
integrated claim; its entire value may be considered when determining whether the
amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is satisfied.... ."); Edge v.
Blockbuster Video, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254-56 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (injunction that
would prohibit "course of conduct as a whole" and would inure to the "collective good"
of the class was common and undivided and should be valued from the defendant's
viewpoint for purposes of the amount in controversy); Loizon v. SMH Societe Suisse de
Microelectronics, et Horologerie, 950 F. Supp. 250, 254 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that
class members had common and undivided interest in injunctive relief because "[i]n this
case, only the class, and not individual class members, could request the injunctive
relief'); Earnest v. Gen. Motors Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1469, 1472 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (class
had undivided interest in injunctive relief in the form of advertising campaign,
comprehensive vehicle recall, and injunction forbidding the defendants from using
allegedly defective engines and engine control modules).
140. See Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 607.
141. Id. at 483.
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creates a sometimes insurmountable burden on the defendant's removal power.
It encourages manipulation and forum shopping and results in the very inequities
that the removal statutes were intended to prevent. The party seeking jurisdiction
viewpoint produces results inconsistent with removal principles. The either party
viewpoint restores balance where the scales of justice have been knocked off
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